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The use of swaps by local administrations:  
the case of Italian regions, 2007-2014 
 
Structured abstract 
Purpose (mandatory) — This study contributes to the literature on local administrations’ 
debt and attempts to answer the following research questions: i) What effects do swaps 
produce on regions’ debt? ii) Have swaps been used to finance discretionary debt? 
Design/methodology/approach (mandatory) – The paper investigates the debt burden 
as influenced by economic, financial and political variables and forces with panel data 
techniques, and tests whether swaps have been used to financing debt due to unfunded 
expenditures.  
Findings (mandatory) — Panel data results of 15 Italian regions over the 2007-2014 
period shows that regions with higher debt exhibited a higher interest rate exposure and 
have employed derivatives hoping to counterbalance the reduced resources received from 
the central state, in line with other European countries’ experience (i.e., France and 
Greece). 
Research limitations/implications (if applicable) - The scarcity of official data and 
information on swaps has limited the empirical investigations in the literature but did not 
reduce the losses of local administrations. 
Originality/value (mandatory) –This study creates the first database on swaps 
purchased by Italian regions to investigate their impact on their debt. Results show that 
highly indebted regions with reduced funds from the central state and diminished local 
resources are more likely to use swaps to fund their debt. Italian regions heavily depended 
on long-term debt to finance their non-healthcare services, rather than current revenues; 










I. Introduction  
This paper investigates how financial derivatives have been used to finance discretionary 
debt by Italian Regions after the financial crisis. There has been limited research 
examining the use of swaps by local governments pre - and post - Great Recession and 
there is no access to data on Over The Counter (OTC) derivatives used by local 
administrations because of confidentiality. Therefore, we manually collected data on 
derivatives' usage from 2007 to 2014 from the annual reports of the Italian Corte dei 
Conti, the Italian public audit court (2016 and previous years). Before 2007 most 
Mediterranean countries adopted the cash-based accounting method, which limited the 
availability of data on OTC derivatives instruments by central and local administrations. 
After the introduction of accrual accounting by most European countries in 2007, which 
represented a significant improvement in the transparency and accountability (Brusca and 
Montesinos, 2010), researchers have been able to collect data on derivative usage by 
Italian regions. 
Monitoring and supervision of swaps is difficult for the Italian public sector. Indeed, 
swaps are not traded through exchanges or intermediaries, but they are governed by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Master Agreement. The Bank 
of Italy publishes yearly data on OTC contracts underwritten by local administrations 
(only) with Italian banks. The Italian Treasury holds a supervisory role over regions, and 
since 2009 has monitored the financial effects of swaps. Lastly, the Corte dei Conti (2016 
and previous years) monitors their juridical effects, and in its annual reports, it has 
explicitly condemned the debt management practices of local administrations requesting 
Parliamentary intervention, rigorous accounting and management rules.  
As the result of a large reform effort undertaken in 2001, Italy has moved decidedly 
toward a federal model of governance. The Italian federal reform helped to improve 
accounting transparency and reinforced the so-called ‘horizontal’ accountability, from the 
administration towards citizens and other stakeholders (Mabillard and Zumofen 2016, p. 
6); however, the information on financial risks is still relatively poor, reducing the 
‘vertical’ transparency of debt management in the hierarchy between organizations. 
Despite the aforementioned efforts Italian regions have been asked to manage an 
increasing portfolio of duties vis a vis their citizens. The latter, coupled with poor growth 
and the decrease of state transfers (i.e. fiscal austerity) contributed to a marked increase 
in their debt, which doubled in the 2007–2014 period.  
The previous literature confirmed that the principal-agent theory (Lane, 2005) explained 
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the opportunistic use of derivatives by local administrations in need of funding (i.e. the 
agents), given the opaque information available to the central state (i.e. the principal). 
The main duty of Italian regions is the supply of healthcare services, whereas the 
provision of non-healthcare services (e.g. transport, education, training, and 
infrastructures) is discretionary and its extent varies depending on the specific region. 
Therefore, debt originating from (unfunded) non-healthcare expenditures is considered 
discretionary and swaps can be used to fund it. 
Our results show that regions with higher debt exhibited a higher interest rate exposure 
and employed derivatives in their attempts to counterbalance the reduced resources 
received from the central state. This result is in line with what happens in other European 
countries like France and Greece. 
This research is of interest to academics, practitioners, and policymakers as it investigates 
the impact of swaps on local debt issued by Italian regions after the Great Recession, it 
provides evidence of the use of swaps to counterbalance the reduced resources (not only 
to hedge the interest rate risk), and offers policy implications that could be of help for 
other countries. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II reviews the literature, Section III 
discusses the research goals and methodology, Section IV describes the empirical data, 
Section V presents the econometric results, and the last section lays out the study's main 
conclusions.  
 
II. Literature review 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the use of derivatives by local 
administration after the financial crisis of 2007.  
To date, theoretical and empirical research on derivative usage by the corporate sector 
(e.g. Bodnar, Consolandi, Gabbi, Jaiswal-Dale, 2013; and Bartram, 2019) is vast. 
Previous studies showed that large companies were more likely to use financial 
derivatives. The main drivers can be identified in the economies of scale, in hedging 
requirements to maximize corporate value, or maximizing risk-averse manager’s utility.  
Several studies investigated the use of derivatives in federal countries, especially those 
adopting the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) such as 
Brailsford, Heaney and Oliver, (2005); Stewart and Cox (2008); Howell-Moroney and 
Hall (2011); Luby (2012); Denison and Gibson (2013); Luby and Singla (2014); and 
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Khumawala, Ranasinghe and Yan (2016). A detailed description of purpose, mechanism 
and risks of swaps in the public sector is that by Luby and Kravchuk, 2013 (pp. 280-288). 
Brailsford, Heaney and Oliver (2005) found that the determinants of derivatives’ use by 
Australian Commonwealth public sector organizations were size and liabilities. 
Furthermore, organizations that faced a greater budget complexity or paid tax and 
dividends were more likely to use derivatives. Stewart and Cox (2008) reported that the 
notional value of derivatives signed by 100 of the largest U.S. municipalities in 2003 was 
$10.6 billion. Luby (2012) reviewed the use of debt-related derivatives by the city of 
Chicago and concluded that refinancing problems were mainly related to the pricing and 
debt management mistakes, and derivative-borne moral hazard. Luby and Kravchuk 
(2013) reported that the use of derivatives by U.S. states and municipalities increased 
between 2003 and 2009 because of  ‘their long-term efficacy but also because of the lack 
of flexibility in unwinding these financial contracts in a cost-effective manner’ (p.306). 
Luby and Singla (2014) surveyed the use of debt-related derivatives by 30 U.S. states in 
the period 2005–2010 and discovered that only 20 had public policies guiding their 
management. Therefore, according to these studies, highly indebted and financially 
sophisticated states used more derivative contracts. U.S. local administrations did not 
purchase swaps with large sums of money up-front because these clauses were not very 
transparent to the public. A few public administrations have filed for bankruptcy due to 
financial mismanagement involving swap contracts: for example, the $2 billion default 
by Orange County (California) in 1994 and the $4 billion default by Jefferson County 
(Alabama) in 2011 were caused by excessive financial risks (Denison and Gibson, 2013; 
Howell-Moroney and Hall, 2011). Khumawala, Ranasinghe, and Yan (2016) showed that 
over half of the U.S. municipal sector between 2005 and 2008 used swap contracts mainly 
to manage the interest rate risk exposure; they were the largest and financially constrained 
entities. They found that ‘more sophisticated managers of large municipalities and less 
sophisticated managers of small municipalities are more likely to engage in derivative 
transactions’ (p.303). 
Due to the lack of official data, very few research studies have investigated the use of 
swaps at either the central or local level in Europe. Piga (2001) documented the strategic 
use of swaps by central European governments to shrink their budget deficit before 
adopting the euro (i.e. France, Italy and Greece). This window-dressing effect was 
achieved thanks to inadequate accounting standards at the time. Italy and France used 
interest rates and currency swaps to reduce interest payments in 1997–1998, as these were 
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‘two critical years for the European Monetary Union process needed to keep the budget 
deficit-to-GDP ratio within the 3% level required by the Stability and Growth Pact’ (Piga, 
2001, p. 208). Lagna (2016) showed that during the 1993-1999 period, Italian 
governments implemented ‘statecraft strategies by exploiting the market-based methods 
and technologies of financial innovation’ (p. 178) and gained from financial speculation. 
Local administrations in Europe mimicked the behaviour of the central state; Pérignon 
and Vallée (2017) empirically verified, using proprietary data from 2,700 French local 
authorities that complex OTC contracts (i.e. structured loans) sold by Dexia Crediop from 
2000 to 2009 were employed to ‘obfuscate budget imbalances and [...] help incumbent 
politicians win a re-election’ (p. 1904). The use of structured loans shifted interest 
payments in the future. As a result, in 2015, 676 local French administrations asked for 
state rescue because they were unable to repay their loans, especially those indexed to the 
Swiss Franc exchange rate (which had implicit rates varying from 12.5% to 81%), with 
losses worth €2 billion (Cour des Comptes, 2017). Italian and French local 
administrations extensively used swaps, and similarities between these two countries 
were relevant (Oldani, 2019). Indeed, local administrations in both countries enjoyed 
little control and supervision. 
During the last decade, reforms have been introduced in the management of public entities 
and have been based on two paradigms, which are the New Public Management (NPM) 
and the Principles of Good Governance.  
The reform of the accounting systems in Europe aimed at increasing the transparency and 
timeliness of publicly available information, in particular, with the adoption of the accrual 
accounting system and the use of the financial statements. A consequence of these 
changes has been the devolution of the financial delegation and budget accountability to 
public managers; in turn this has led to public managers’ performance being judged 
according to the same parameters generally used in the corporate sector. A part of the 
literature argued that accrual accounting can allow managers and politicians to exercise 
discretion while reporting assets and liabilities and recognizing revenues and expenses, 
pushing for accounting manipulation and earnings management. Indeed, Cohen, Bisogno 
and Malkogianni (2019) empirically verified that Italian local governments engaged in 
earning management in the 2008-2015 period, after the introduction of accrual 
accounting. The adoption by Italian local administrations of the financial statement had 
certain positive effects on accountability and performance. However, social 
legitimization seemed to put pressure on Italian local government officers more than 
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accountability patterns or performance analysis (Carini, Giacomini, and Teodori, 2018). 
Brusca and Montesinos (2010) described the development of accrual accounting among 
European countries, and Soverchia (2010) compared Italy with the U.S. and the European 
Union to highlight differences that could substantially reduce financial transparency and 
increase suspicions of accounting manipulation.  
With this paper, we fill an important gap in the literature and describe how swaps have 
been employed by Italian regions, and which effects they produced on their debt position.  
 
III. Research design: goals and methodology 
The present study attempts to answer the following research questions: i) What effects do 
swaps produce on Italian regions' debt? ii) Have swaps been used to finance discretionary 
spending?  
To answer these research questions, this study focuses on ordinary statute regions (ORS), 
the first level of local administration, representing over 75% of the Italian territory and 
population (Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, 
Marche, Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata and Calabria). Border 
regions and the islands, which enjoy a higher level of autonomy - especially in terms of 
revenues - are thus excluded.  
Over the past few years, Italy has consistently ran a primary surplus. However, the debt 
reduction program has also diminished the amount of resources transferred to local 
administrations, which introduced local taxes to fund their expenditures. Regions’ 
expenditures have not decreased, due to rising healthcare costs and to an ageing 
population. In the absence of expenditure cuts, Italian regions have covered their fiscal 
needs with a mix of new taxes and increased borrowing. In addition, the nature of the 
aforementioned mix is plausibly influenced by the national and international economic 
context: negative or stagnating growth between 2007 and 2014 is likely to have tipped 
the balance towards more debt rather than sharp increase in taxes and services’ reduction. 
We thus expect that regions with high outstanding debt are unlikely to cut services and 
increase taxes, and are instead very likely to further increase their debt.  
Regions’ debt can be financed with bonds sold to professional investors, loans with the 
financial agency of the Italian Treasury, and cash from the Treasury. The Republic of 
Italy guarantees the liabilities of all regions, but their debt repayment capacity depends 
on revenues (Piperno, 2013). Since 1998, over 65% of regional debt has been in the form 
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of loans (Banca d’Italia, 2018). Total regional debt was €14 billion in 1998, €27 billion 
in 2007, and €57 billion in 2014 (figure 1).  
 
Fig. 1 – Debt of 15 regions (2007-2014, thousand euro) 
 
Source: Corte dei Conti, Relazione sulla gestione finanziaria delle Regioni, 2001-2016. 
 
During the period under observation (2007-2014) Italian regions issued fixed-rate debt 
(with Cassa Depositi e Prestiti) and swapped it with floating rate contracts (often with 
caps and floors) to lock in their maximum interest expense and gain from decreasing 
interest rates. Information provided by authorities on swaps, such as the Corte dei Conti 
(2016 and previous years) excluded the shifting of debt forward and up-front payments. 
Regions described their liabilities, including swaps in the financial statement in the 
following way: ‘An interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange 
a series of interest payments based on a notional amount of debt (usually a specified 
amount of outstanding bonds) without exchanging the underlying debt. The economic 
benefit from an interest rate swap is a result of the principle of comparative advantage. 
This comparative advantage emanates from imperfections in different money and capital 
markets’ (Luby 2012, p.4) 
Campania represents a useful example (Campania 2018) and Fig. 2 shows the financial 
structure of a swap contract. Campania is a large and densely populated region in the 
South of Italy, and used a swap contract in 2003, expiring in 2023. The underlying asset 
was a variable rate (indexed at the Euribor) mortgage of €850million with Cassa Depositi 








1998 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Total debt Health care debt Non-health care debt
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group), Dexia Crediop, JP Morgan and Banca Intesa. During the 2009-2014 period, the 
Euribor rate has been lower than 5.5%, and Campania paid 5.23% (5.73% after 2015) 
fixed interest rate to banks, instead of the (lower) Euribor rate. The region did not reduce 
its interest’s expenses with the swap contract. In 2014, the mark-to-market of this swap 
was negative for €115 million, in 2018 was negative €60 million. In 2018, the synthetic 
cost of the debt, including the swap, was 3.745%, diminishing in the following 2 years 
(3.456% and 3.149% respectively in 2019, and 2020). 
 
 
Figure 2. Region swap payoff scheme 






















In the 2007–2014 period, the notional value of swaps of the 15 regions reached €12 billion 
(figure 3). Data on swaps (notional value, gross market value, fees or other payments, and 
revenues) have not been disclosed by Italian authorities because of contracts’ 
confidentiality; therefore, we manually collected them from the annual reports of the 
Corte dei Conti (2016 and previous years). According to the data, their use greatly varied 
Region Banks 
If Euribor6M  5.5% pays 5.23% 
If Euribor6M >5.5% pays Euribor +0.4% 
 
Euribor6M + 0.44% 
Floating rate regional bonds  
Euribor6M + 0.44% 
Region 
Banks 
If Euribor6M  6% pays 5.73% 
If Euribor6M >6% pays Euribor6M +0.4% 
 
Euribor6M + 0.44% 
Floating rate regional bonds  
Euribor6M + 0.44% 
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amongst Italian regions: in particular, Piedmont, Lazio, and Campania had over €1 trillion 
of yearly notional value outstanding, whereas Basilicata had negligible exposure. 
As a result of the growth of debt, the ratio between the notional value of swaps and debt 
decreased over the 2007–2014 period. Regions that exhibited a ratio of swaps on total 
debt greater than 50% are Liguria, Abruzzi, Molise, and Campania, but only the debt of 
Campania follows an explosive path.  
 
 
Fig. 3 – Swap notional value (thousand euro) of 15 regions and with respect to debt (%) 2007-2014 
 
Source: Corte dei Conti, Relazione sulla gestione finanziaria delle Regioni, 2001-2016.  
 
The literature has given scant attention to the debt capacity and affordability of Italian 
local administrations, and contrary to the U.S. experience, chief financial officers are not 
provided with any guiding principles for liabilities’ management. The debt burden of 
local administrations has been influenced by economic, political, and demographic 
variables and forces, as follows (Bahl and Duncombe, 1993; Kriz and Wang, 2012; 
Rodríguez Bolívar, Navarro Galera, Alcaide Muñoz, and López Subirés, 2016): 
 
Total debtit = c + α Xit + γt+ νi + εit           (1) 
 
where i refers to region and t to year; Total debt refers the total debt of the administration; 
X is a set of socio-economic variables and financial determinants of the debt of local 
administration, such as the GDP of the area (i.e. North, Centre, and South), tax revenues, 
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is a year dummy, and νi is a region dummy. This framework is flexible enough to consider 
financial innovation, such as swaps, among the determinants of debt, and has already been 
applied to Italian regions by Figari and Gandullia (2008), who investigated the debt 
dynamics of Italian regions in the 1996–2003 period (before the regions used swaps and 
before the full implementation of federalism) by considering local variables (i.e. 
population and local GDP) and financial variables (i.e. taxes and transfers from the central 
state) as determinants of debt.  
To answer the first research question, we empirically investigate the determinants of total 
debt for Italian regions, as follows: 
 
Total debtit = c + α Interest expenseit + β GDP localit + γ Political partyit + 
+ τ Tax revenueit + δ Notional valueit      (2) 
 
where Total debtit represents the debt of i-th region in year t. The main drivers of a 
region’s total debt in equation (2) are its costs, Interest expenseit and the size of the region, 
as measured by GDP localit, which is the GDP of the area (i.e. Northeast, Northwest, 
Centre, and South). We consider also the GDP per capita as a measure of the region’s 
size, but econometric results do not change. The leading Political partyit helps explain 
the dynamics of debt because, throughout the history of Italy, left-wing parties have 
contributed to debt stockpiling. Tax revenueit is the most relevant revenue of regions and 
strongly affects their ability to repay debt, according to standard public finance theory. 
Equation (2) is estimated with a fixed-effects model because the legislation on regions’ 
liabilities changed over the period under observation, and the Hausman test supports this 
choice. Following the literature and with the heteroscedasticity found through the 
Breusch-Pagan test on the ordinary least squares (OLS) results, this study employs the 
robust OLS estimator. 
The effect of swaps on the total debt is measured considering the Notional valueit of 
contracts: this variable is the nominal exposure at the reporting date (i.e. at the end of the 
year). We choose to employ the notional value of OTC contracts to be consistent with the 
methods employed in other countries’ case studies (Khumawala, Ranasinghe, and Yan, 
2016; Stewart and Cox, 2008). 
To answer the second research question, following Pérignon and Vallée (2017), who 
empirically verified that toxic loans amplified the principal-agent problem in the French 
political system using a rich dataset, this study tests whether swaps have been used by 
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Italian regions to finance discretionary debt (after the federal reform of the State, debt 
originating from (unfunded) non-healthcare expenditures is considered as discretionary). 
It is then relevant to estimate whether derivatives’ notional market value is driven by non-




= c + α Non-healthcare debtit + β Interest expenseit  (3) 
 
where Notional valueit refers to the derivative contracts of the i-th region in year t, Non-
healthcare debtit is debt unrelated to healthcare services and Interest expenseit is a 
measure of the costs of debt. The Breusch-Pagan test on the OLS results detects 
heteroscedasticity; thus, the robust OLS estimator has been employed to estimate 
equation (3) on 15 regions.  
 
IV. Data 
Variables employed in the estimates over the 2007–2014 period are described in Table 1 
and are measured in euros, except for the dummy variable. The use of swap is investigated 
for all 15 Italian regions. 
The yearly data have been collected from different sources: whereas data from the Italian 
National Bureau of Statistics (ISTAT), the Bank of Italy, and the Italian regional 
accounting system (Commission for Fiscal Federalism Development, or COPAFF) are 
fully accessible, the Corte dei Conti does not provide researchers access to its data. 
Therefore, the authors of this study manually compiled the first database of swaps, 
collecting data on notional values and total debt of regions from the tables published in 
the annual reports of the Corte dei Conti. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The second column of Table 1 reports the predictions between the dependent variable of 
equation (2), the region’s total debt, and the explanatory variables.  
Following Brailsford, Heaney, and Oliver (2005) and considering that the relationship 
between the two variables is simultaneous, a positive coefficient is expected between 
GDP local and Total debt because large regions are not likely to decrease their debt, 
especially in the period under consideration, characterised by a significant reduction of 
resources from the central state.  
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The Interest expense includes payments related to all liabilities such as swaps. During the 
2007–2014 period, a positive relationship is expected between Interest expense and Total 
debt because a higher debt burden leads to higher interest expenses. Tax revenues finance 
the region’s expenditures and positively correlate with outstanding debt because regions 
with high outstanding debt are likely to further increase their taxes in periods of reduced 
transfers from the central state. According to the law, local authorities can issue loans 
with the Treasury at a fixed rate and later swap these liabilities. Because OTC derivatives 
are hedging contracts, their greater Notional value is the result of high outstanding debt. 
Table 2 shows the variables’ descriptive statistics; the sample is an unbalanced panel 
dataset of 15 Italian regions with 135 region-year observations. The average total debt is 
€2.84 billion, of which 37% is healthcare and 63% is non-healthcare debt. Regardless of 
the economic downturn, in the period under observation, regions increased local taxes to 
fund services to citizens, with the average tax revenue at €6.7 billion. The average yearly 
interest expense is €118 million. The average Italian region’s GDP is €348 billion. In 
66% of the Italian regions, a left-wing political party is in charge, such as the Democratic 
Party. The average notional value of regions is €924 million, with high variability, as 
some regions did not use derivatives’ contracts. Such a large variation confirms regions’ 
different debt management strategies. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation amongst the analysed variables. Total debt exhibits a high 
correlation with the interest expense and notional value, a correlation lower than 0.5 with 
tax revenue, and a very low correlation with the GDP of the area and the political party 
dummy. Tax revenue has a correlation with GDP per capita greater than 0.5, but its 
correlation with other variables is slightly lower than 0.5. The notional value of swaps 
has a high correlation with total debt (0.7) and interest expense (0.6), whereas this figure 
is lower than 0.5 with the other variables. The political party dummy negatively correlates 
with all variables, except the GDP of the area. This can be explained by the fact that left-
wing parties, such as the Democratic Party and Communist Party, have the political 
majority in smaller and less indebted regions (Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, 
Umbria, Marche and Apulia), which represents a departure with respect to the history of 
the Italian stockpiling of debt. 
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The debt repayment capacity of the local administration is influenced by the use of 
instruments such as swap contracts, and, to the best of our knowledge, no previous study 
has adequately investigated this rather important phenomenon. 
Because a regulation on the use of derivatives was absent for most of the period under 
observation, over-indebted regions likely employed swaps in attempts to counterbalance 
the reduced resources received from the central state, in line with other countries’ 
experience and not only to hedge their interest risks. Our empirical analysis investigates 
whether swaps have been used to finance discretionary debt during the 2007-2014 period. 
Table 4 describes the variables employed and reports the predictions between the 
dependent (Notional value) and independent (Interest expense and Non-healthcare debt) 
variables with regard to equation (3). We expect a positive relationship between the 
notional value and the non-healthcare debt and between the notional value and the interest 
expense; thus, being over-indebted should positively correlate with the notional value of 
swaps. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
V. Results 
This section discusses the results of the analysis of swaps’ use by Italian regions. 
Table 5 displays the empirical results by considering the variables’ predictions reported 
in Table 1, to answer the first research question: What effects do swaps produce on Italian 
regions’ debt? We first estimate equation (2) in Table 5A without considering the notional 
value of swaps to better compare the results with the literature, and later introduce the 
notional value in Table 5B. 
In the absence of swaps (Table 5A), the empirical relationship between a region’s total 
debt and its GDP is negative for the 15 regions analysed, confirming the relationship 
found by Figari and Gandullia (2008), according to whom the debt grew when GDP 
slowed down. However, this relationship may also have been accentuated by the 
economic crisis that persisted during most of the period under observation (2007–2014). 
The presence of left-wing ruling parties reduces the debt stockpiling, which represents a 
departure from the historical Italian experience. In the period under observation, right-
wing parties manage highly indebted (and large) regions mostly located in the North of 
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the country, and the reduction of debt by left-wing parties can be explained by the 
geographical distribution in the sample under analysis. The cost of debt (i.e. interest 
expense) and the total debt show a positive and significant coefficient with a stronger 
magnitude than tax revenues. The relationship between the tax revenues—the most 
important source of income for regions—and debt suggests that the sustainability of 
regions’ debt is not high.  
 
[TABLE 5A ABOUT HERE] 
 
Larger regions (e.g. Piedmont, Lombardy, Lazio, and Campania) faced increasing 
demand for public services, but instead of increasing taxes, they preferred to smooth their 
cash flows and entered swap contracts. Indeed, our results confirm that a positive 
relationship between interest expenses and total debt exists. These results are consistent 
with the previous literature according to which local variables (i.e. GDP and political 
majorities) and financial variables (i.e. interests’ expense and tax revenues) are 
determinants of debt of local administrations (Bahl and Duncombe, 1993; Kriz and Wang, 
2012; Rodríguez Bolívar, Navarro Galera, Alcaide Muñoz, and López Subirés, 2016). 
The pursue of cost-effectiveness and efficiency for Italian local administrations indirectly 
drove the use of swaps. Moreover, the absence of debt management principles 
accentuated the contractual opportunism and the principal-agent problem between the 
central state and the local administrations (Lane, 2005), reducing the so-called ‘vertical’ 
transparency of debt management (Mabillard and Zumofen, 2016). 
We shall keep in mind that the empirical results are limited by the quality of information 
on swaps provided by regions and central authorities.  
We consider the use of swaps, following equation (2) and results are reported in Table 
5B. According to the Corte dei Conti (2016 and previous years), swaps had hedging 
purposes to manage the interest expenses, but our results show that they contributed to 
increasing the total debt.   
According to the empirical evidence, regions with higher debt use more derivative 
contracts (measured with the notional value) to manage their interest exposure. The 
principal (the central state) did not limit the use of swaps by the agents (regions) during 
the period under observation. These results confirm that Italian regions implemented 
derivatives-based strategies, similar to the Italian Treasury (Lagna 2016) and French 
municipalities (Pérignon and Vallée, 2017). 
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[TABLE 5B ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 6 shows the empirical results of the relationship between derivatives’ notional 
value, non-healthcare debt and interest expenses for the 15 regions. The coefficient of the 
non-healthcare debt is positive and statistically significant, confirming that swaps have 
been used to finance discretionary (non-healthcare) debt. This evidence indicates the 
reverse causality of the agency problem. The coefficient of interest expenses is positive 
but not statically significant; this confirms the statement of the Corte dei Conti (2016 and 
previous years) according to which regions did not use swaps to pay interests expenses, 
differently from the French experience (Pérignon and Vallée, 2017). Based on these 
empirical results, we can affirm that swaps, measured with their notional value, 
significantly impacted the discretionary debt of regions. 
 
 [TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Our findings are fully consistent with those reported in the public debt management 
literature (Brailsford, Heaney and Oliver; 2005; Khumawala, Ranasinghe, and Yan, 2016; 
Luby and Kravchuk, 2013) according to which swaps have significant effects on the debt 
of public administrations, and are new to the literature that never addressed the Italian 
case. The estimates from equations (2) and (3) fit the Italian data for regions, but the lack 
of detailed data inhibits further investigation and the use of more sophisticated 
econometric procedures, such as those implemented by Pérignon and Vallée (2017) and 
Khumawala et al. (2016).  
 
VI. Conclusions and Implications 
Financial health is one of the goals of NPM and is a necessary condition under which 
governments at the central and local levels must operate. European governments are being 
pressured by citizens and other stakeholders to improve their efficiency and effectiveness 
while facing reductions in available resources. One indication that suggests that NPM has 
harmed Italian municipal governments is the widespread use of swaps hoping to raise extra 
funds and not only to hedge the interest rate risk, with a concomitant increase in exposure 
to financial risk.  
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Other European countries have already suffered relevant losses due to the vicious debt-
swap cycle (i.e., France and Greece). Similarly to the French experience, this study 
confirms that Italian regions used swaps to finance part of their debt, but contrary to the 
Greece case, Italian regions did not use swaps to hide their debt.  
A transparent (accrual-based) accounting system is the first step toward an effective debt 
management system; the second step would be the comprehensive assessment of the 
potential exposure, risks and costs of swap contracts relative to the level of debt. This 
requires the provision of detailed financial information of such contracts, in particular the 
counterpart(s), the duration, the fees, the scenario used to price the swap (including the 
hedge parameters), the default event description, the implicit (interest or exchange) rates 
and the existence of any conflict of interests with financial intermediaries. 
This study fills a gap in the literature with the first empirical investigation in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis on the use of swaps by Italian ordinary statute regions over the 
period 2007–2014. Concerning the first research question, this study reveals that regions 
with higher levels of debt, like Campania, Piedmont, Lombardy, and Lazio, exhibit a 
higher interest rate exposure and employ more derivative contracts (notional value). This 
result is of certain relevance for citizens, given the poor quality of the information 
provided by authorities on such contracts. 
The results imply that highly indebted regions (i.e. those that are with debt larger than €2 
billion: Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio, Campania, and Apulia) with 
reduced funds from the central state and diminished resources were more likely to use 
swap to fund their debt. Indeed, Italian regions heavily depended on long-term debt to 
finance their non-healthcare services, rather than current revenues, such as taxes, leading 
to a significant increase in the financial leverage ratio. A higher leverage ratio is 
associated with greater financial risks, inducing regions to hedge their interest exposures 
with swaps. The fact that regions used swaps to financing discretionary debt indirectly 
confirms that transparency has not improved. Italian citizens know very little about 
derivatives’ contract use and associated risks because of the lack of transparency in the 
regions’ income statements and the complexity of the monitoring and supervision 
process: agents’ actions are unobservable by the principal. This opaqueness limits the 
political losses associated with swaps’ losses. Our empirical results confirm that severe 
agency problems emerge when the cost of current decisions can be shifted in the future 
or are not properly disclosed.  
 18 
Because highly indebted regions are more likely to further increase debt during a period 
of crisis such as 2007–2014, results imply that the use of swaps should be monitored and 
even limited by the central state. The Corte dei Conti asked for a parliamentary 
intervention, and the 2014 Budget Law (Italian Government, 2013) banned the use of 
swaps and other derivative products for all administrations, both central and local. 
However, this limit will be ineffective if the accounting and supervisory systems on 
liabilities are not developed; rules circumvention and regulatory arbitrage can severely 
reduce the effectiveness of the legislative ban. Local administrations should be equipped 
with an accounting and supervisory system to better manage financial risks. This 
administrative infrastructure can be quite expensive for small regions (i.e. Umbria, 
Marche, Molise, and Liguria).  
As in other European countries facing severe downturns, the fragility of the Italian 
legislative system, the lack of responsibility of civil servants and public managers, the 
absence of an organic legislative framework concerning the use of OTC contracts, 
fragmented control, weakened monitoring and inadequate accounting procedures all 
contribute to scepticism regarding the use of swaps and strongly limit their financial 
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Table 1 – Variables description and prediction using eq.2 - 15 Italian regions (2007-2014) 
Variable Prediction  Description Source 




Is the notional value of swaps at the 
reporting date in euro 
Corte dei Conti 
Tax Revenue + Revenue from proper taxes in euro 
Commissione tecnica paritetica per 
l’attuazione del federalismo fiscale 
COPAFF 
Interest Expense + Is the cost of debt in euro 
Commissione tecnica paritetica per 
l’attuazione del federalismo fiscale 
COPAFF 
GDP of the area, 
GDP per capita 
- Measure the size of the region in euro Italian Bureau of Statistics ISTAT  
Political Party + 
Dummy = 1 when a left wing party 
rules (Democratic Party, Communist 
other leftist parties) and = 0 when a 
right-wing party rules the Region 
(Berlusconi-Forza Italia, Christian 




Table 2 – Descriptive statistics - 15 Italian regions (2007-2014)   
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Debt 135 2,840,000,000 3,520,000,000 222,000,000 19,900,000,000 
of which: non-healthcare debt 135 1,740,000,000 1,960,000,000 106,000,000 8,660,000,000 
Swap Notional Value 135 924,000,000 1,190,000,000 0 5,210,000,000 
Tax Revenue 105 6,690,000,000 5,150,000,000 377,000,000 23,700,000,000 
Interest Expense 135 118,000,000 140,000,000 9,882,108 738,000,000 
GDP Geogr. Area 120 348,000,000,000 99,100,000,000 248,000,000,000 535,000,000,000 
GDP Per Capita 105 24,665 5,657 16,101 35,127 
Political Party (dummy) 135 0.66 0.48 0 1 
 



















Total Debt 1.00       
Tax Revenue 0.43 1.00 
     
GDP Per Capita 0.21 0.64 1.00     
GDP Geogr. Area 0.18 0.52 0.76 1.00    
Interest Expense 0.94 0.44 0.27 0.18 1.00   
Political Party (dummy) -0.35 -0.32 -0.04 0.01 -0.23 1.00  
Swap Notional Value  0.69 0.25 -0.19 -0.04 0.60 -0.29 1.00 
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Table 4 – Variables description and prediction using eq.3 - 15 Italian regions (2007-2014) 
Variable Prediction Description Source 
Swap Notional 
Value 
Dep. Variable Is the notional value of swaps in euro Corte dei Conti 
Interest expense + Is the cost of debt in euro 
Commissione tecnica paritetica 
per l’attuazione del federalismo 
fiscale - COPAFF 
Non-healthcare debt + 
Is the region's debt not due to 
healthcare expenses measured in 
euro 
Commissione tecnica paritetica 
per l’attuazione del federalismo 
fiscale - COPAFF 
 
Table 5A – Robust OLS Estimates Results - Eq. 2 (2007-2014) 
Dep. Var. Total Debt 15 Italian Regions 
GDP of the area -25,894.408 
p-value (0.42) 
Political party -762,417,100** 
p-value (0.01) 
Interest expense 21.53*** 
p-value (0.00) 




R-squared (within) 0.88 
Number of obs. 75 
Fixed Effect  Yes 












Table 5B – Robust OLS Estimates Results - Eq. 2 (2007-2014) 
Dep. Var. Total Debt 15 Italian Regions 
GDP Geogr. Area 32,029.391 
p-value (0.18) 
Political Party -601,435,400** 
p-value (0.00) 
Interest Expense 19.11*** 
p-value (0.00) 
Tax Revenue -0.02 
p-value (0.37) 




R-squared (within) 0.90 
Number of obs. 75 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes 
Legenda: *, **, *** reports significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
Table 6 – Robust OLS Estimates Results - Eq. 3 (2007-2014) 








R-squared (within) 0.41 
Number of obs. 135 
Year Fixed Effect  Yes 
Legenda: *, **, *** reports significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
